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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
HARRIS BETHERS, 
Plai-ntiff and Respo-nd~n.t, 
vs. 
LALIF VlOOD, dba 
INDUSITRIAL 
c.ONSTRlfCTION COMPANY, 
Defen.danl an.d Appellan-t. 
Case No. 9062 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT ~~XD APPELLANT 
NA.TURE OF CASE 
Plaintiff sottght to r e c o "T e r the sum of 
$29,009.90 claimed due hin1 for the performance of 
a subcontract entered into ·between himself and the 
defendant, whereby the pla"intiff undertook to fur-
nish gravel required in the construction of a high-
way from East Faria Creek, Utah; to Utah-Arizona 
State Line. The defen'dant 'vas at the time under 
contract with the L"tah State Road Commission to 
build the road in accordance 'vith the pro\risions of 
a prime contract. 
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Defendant counterclaimed and alleged a right 
of set-off for a sum in excess of the claim made by 
the plaintiff by reason of plaintiff's default, aris-
ing from his delay in furnishing the gravel as di-
rected h:\r defendant and as set forth in the contract. 
During the cout•se of trial, while defendant 
"\Vas presenting h'is caRe, the court ruled as a matter 
of lav-vT that the subcontract prevented defendant 
from asserting any damages by way of counter-
claim. 
STATE:\·IENT OF FACTS 
On January 16, 1957, defendant, doing busi-
ness as Industrial Construction ·company, entered 
into a contract with the uta~h State Road Commis-
slion, wherein he undertoo~k to construct a bituminous 
surfaced road in Kane County, State of Utah,. be-
tween nine miles east of Paria Creek and the Utah-
Arizona ·state L'inc, identified as Project No .. F. L .. 
P. ·31 (1) and S. P .. 1583, of approximat£ly 12 .. 041 
miles in length. Under the terms of the contract, 
defendant agreed to furnish labor and materials 
for the const1,.uction of the road in accordance with 
the drawings, plans, and specifications and adden-
dums atta·ched to and made a part of the contract, 
all as set forth in Exhibit 10. 
On the 17th day of January, 1957, defendant 
entered into a subcontract with plaintiff, Harris 
Bethers, whereby the latter undertook and agreed 
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to furnish the gravel required in the construction 
of the highway.. (Exhibit P .. l). 
Since some of the provisions of that contract 
are in dispute, they will be set forth at length for 
the purpose of future reference .. Section 3 of the 
contract provides; 
'~The subcontractor agrees to complete 
the several portions and the "\vhole of the work 
herein sublet by the time or time following: 
(Here insei·t the date or date and if there 
be liquidated damages~ state them.) 
.Ill 
~'De1i,~ery of materials to keep up as di-
rected, behind grading equipment at all times .. 
Should ·contractor have to assume charge on 
account of delay by subcontractor, the expense 
accrue'd therein '"~ill ibe deducted from the 
contract price. Contractor to recei~le gra,vell at 
site of crushing plant in the bin.'~ 
Section 5 provides: 
~'The contractor and subcontractor agree 
to be bound ·by the terms of the Agreement, 
the general conditions, drawings~ and speci-
fications as far as applicable to this subcon-
tract, and also by the following. provisions: 
* * * The contractor agrees -
" (k) to make no demand for liquidated 
damages or penalty for delay in any sum in 
excess of such amount as may be specifically 
named in this subcontract. 
'' ( 1) That no claim for services ren-
dered or material furnished by the contractor 
to the subcontractor shall be valid unless 
written notice thereof is given by the con-
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tl~actor to the subcontractor during the first 
ten days of the calendar month following 
that in which the claim originated.'' 
Upon signing the subcontract, defendant in-
strtlcted the plaintiff as to the manner 'in which 
gravel was tD be supplied in order that deliveries 
of materials would be kept up to the g1·ading equip-
ment (T. 134-135). Plaintiff informed the defen-
dant that he would ·be on the jo·b ready to crush 
gTavcl in approximately one week from the date 
the subcontract was signed, January 17, 1957 (T. 
13'7). Plaintiff did not move the gravel crusher 
onto the job until approximately March 4, allthough 
defendant began preparing the gracling operation 
one month previously (T. 58). At the t'ime the 
crushing equipment arrived, approximately 20 per 
cent of rough grading had been completed by plain~ 
tiff (Exhibit 15, Weekly Report No .. 5) .. Although 
-:., 
the contract spec'ified that defendant was to re-
ceive the gravel supplied by the contractor at the 
site of the crushing plant in the bin, the ·bin was 
not supplied ·by the plaintiff until April 4, 1957, 
(T. 61), which required defendant to employ addi-
tional equipment in order to handle the gravel as 
it was crushed ('T. 63). The defen·dant was to supply 
scales for we'ighing the gravel before placing it 
upon the road bed; and although the scales were 
not placed at the job site until sometime between 
February 25, 1957, and March 4, 1957, (T. 100-
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1:~1), the defendant testified that he could ha·ve 
had scales available on 48 hours' notice ·but didn't 
bring them to the job site until plaintiff determined 
'vhere he was going to set his crusher. The scales 
weighed between 15 and 20 tons, and plaintiff 
\Vished to avoid unnecessary handling (T. 131-1'32). 
l\.f r~ Hilton, the State Resident Engineer, testified 
that, if the crusher had been in ope1,.a.tion 1Jefore 
the scales arrived, the grav·el supplied could have 
been stockpiled and then weighed before placing 
it on the road (T. 122)~ 
Considerable ev'idence was introduceld tending 
to show the manner in which the construction of the 
road \Vas to proceed, through ·Mr. Hilton, Resident 
Engineer for the State of lTtah, (Tt 76-7) and also 
by Mr. Wood (T. 136). Mr. \Vood, on numerous 
occasions, directed the plaintiff to produce gravel 
at a faster rate so that it could be kept up with the 
grading equipment fT. 59, 139-140, 144, 149, 151, 
152, and 153). By June 28, 1957, the grading phase 
of the construction had reached a point where the 
entire grade of the roadbed \vas ·in a condition to 
receive all of the g1,.ave1 (T. 86). At that time the 
production of gravel v-.~as approximately four miles 
1behind the grading, although the ev'iden·ce indicated 
that the gravel could reasonably be expected to keep 
within 500 to 1000 feet of the grading equipment 
(T. 151-152) .. Mr. Wood testified that had the 
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gravel been supplied pursuant to his instructions 
and directions to the plaintiff, that he had the equip-
Inent standing available to lay it; and that the road 
'vould hav·e been virtually complete at that time 
except to mix and lay oil and the ''applying of chips 
and final clean-up" ( T. 155-156) ~ 
Under the terms of the contract, plaintiff was 
requ.ired to supply three types of gravel. However, 
none of the gravel items were fully ·supplied until 
August 10, 1957, when the gravel base item was 
completed (Exhibit 15, Report 29). 
On the 4th day of December, 1957, the parties 
entered 'into an Agreement for the pru"pose of ~'com­
pleting two itetns covered ·by this contract (of J anu-
ary 17, 1957), without affecting the rights of either 
of said parties under the terms of the contract 
dated January 17, 1957" (Exhib'it 4). 
On December 21, 195'7, defendant terminated 
plaintiff for 'his failure to meet the schedule set 
forth in the Supplemental Agi·eernent of December 
4, 1957. In this connection the trial court found 
that ''on or about the 20:I"d day of December,-1957, 
the defendant tvok over performance of the said 
Supplen1ental Agreement and incurred expenses in 
procuri11g gravel from other sources, which expenses 
have been charged against the contract price due 
plaintiff" ( T. 162). 
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During the course of defendant~s case, the 
court, on motion of plaintiff's counsel, took under 
consideration the effect of Section 3 of the Sub-
contract, as well as Subsections (k) and (1) of 
Sect'ion 5 of the contract ( T. 157 and 158) 4 The 
court rule·d as a matter o'f law that the defendant 
was not entitled to claim damages as asserterl in 
his counterclaim ·by reason of these sections as more 
fully appears from the Conclusions of La"v made 
and entered by the cout~t herein (T. 164). Judgment 
\vas entered for p~aintiff in the sum of $2'7,082.62, 
with interest in the amount of $2,349.71, and costs. 
STAITEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT 1~ 
THE COURT ERRED l:t\ ... RULIKG AS A !\fATTER 
OF LA\'7 THAT THE PROVISIONS O~F THE SUB~ 
CONTRACT AND P AR.TICULARL Y SECTIOl\... 3 ... ~ND 
SECTIOK 5 PRECLUDED THE DEFENDAKT FROM 
AS"SER.TTNG THE ALLE·GED DAIVIAGRS AS SET 
FORTH IN TTI8 COL"N1'ERCLl\J1'f AND l)fSJVI1'SSING 
DEFENDAl\'"'T'S COUNTERCL ... ~J)f \VITH 'PREJlJDICE. 
A. Damages resulting from delay in performance of 
a contract, ur failure to perform it vrith'in the ~ime 
agreed, is the actual loss sustained by reason of 
the delay. 
B. ·Section 3 of the contract does not provide ·an exclu-
sive remedy of defendant, and taking ovet· of the 
supple.mental contract by defendant did not con-
stitu tc a waiver of his right to assert damages 
against plaintiff, \v·hich arose from delay4 
C. Section 3 of the contract does not make provision 
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... 
for liquidated damages, as ref erred to in Section 
5 (k). Thus~ the basis for computing damages is 
the actual damage ·suffered by defendant by reason 
of the delay. 
D. Section 5 ( 1) does not require defendant to give 
notice to p"la in tiff for damages .so ugh t for delay in 
performing the contract .. 
POIKT II, 
THE C-OCRT ERRE·D L\T FINDING THAT PLA.IN-
TIFF Fl~RNISIIED GR ... ~ \.TEL TO THE DEFENDANT 
IN ACCORDANCE \VITH THE REQUIREI\fENTS OF 
THR ·suBCONTRACT AND THAT PLAINTIFF SUB-
·STANTIAI~I~Y PERFORIVIED ALL OF THE COVE-
N.A.NTS AGREED BY "HI~I TO BE PERFORMED .. 
ARGUMENT 
POIN~ I. 
THE 'COURT ERRED J)J R"L;LIKG AS A ::\fATTER 
OF LA\V THAT THE PROVISIONS OF THE SUB-
CONTRACT AND PARTICUIAARLY SECTION 3 AND 
SECTION 5 PRECLUDEID TilE DEFENDAKT FROM 
ASSERTING THE AL.LEGED DAMAGES AS SET 
FORTH IN THE C-OUNTERCLAIM AND DISMISSING 
DEFENDANT'S OOUNTER·CLA'IIVI WITH PREJUDICE~ 
A.. Damages resulting from delay in performance of 
a contract~ or failure to perform it 'vith"in the time 
agreed~ is the actua1 Joss sustained by reason of 
the delay. 
1There appears no serious disagreement with 
the general rule of law that the measure of dam-
ages for delay in the performance of a contract 
or the failure to perform it within the time agreed 
upon is the actual loss sustained by reason the 
8 
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delay. 15 Am .. Jur., Damages, Sec. 47; U. S. v. 
Smith, 94 U. S. 214, 24 L. Ed. 115; lJ. S. v. ill-Hller, 
113 U~ S. 153t 5 S. ·ct. 380, 28 L. Ed. 946; Spragtte 
vt Boyles Bros. Drilli-ng Co., 294 P. 2d 689, 4 Uta·h 
2d344 (1956)~ 
No limitation appears to be placed llpon the 
11ature of the damage resulting from delay in the 
performance of a contract for which recovery can 
be had, provided the claim is proved by satisfactory 
evidence. 
In the instant case, the defenda11t sought to 
claim and recoup against the agreed price the actual 
damages sustained by him ·by reason of defendant's 
delay4 1This, in effect, was the point at issue in the 
case of Wisconsin Bridge L\.~ Iron Co. ·v. C·itu of 
Alpen.a, 2~38 Mich .. 164, 213 N. "\\T. 93 (1927), 
Where the plaintiff COTitTacted 'vith the defendant 
city to build a bridge an·d submitted t'vo bids show .. 
ing different prices for different con1pletion dates. 
The city accepted the higher 'bid for faster comple-
tion. The contract did not stipulate damages fot~ 
delay, and the contract 'vas not performed 'vithin 
the agreed time. The city vlithheld approximate1y 
$2,000.00 of the contract price, which it claimed 
as damages resulting from the delaJr. The plaintiff 
sued, an·d the city defended, claiming recoupment, 
and a jury returned a verdict in favor of the city 
based on the difference between the original two 
·bid prices. 
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The Appellate court reversed the jury award 
because the remedy under the low and unaccepted 
bi'd exacted a penalty and was not an ''admeasure-
ment of damages .. ', 
The court then said: 
"If a contract pl~ovides no remedy by 
way of liquidated damages, then damages in 
recoupment of the contract price must be 
established ~y evidence showing actual dam-
ages and the amonnt thereof. * * * Failure 
of plaintiff to perfonn within the time fixed 
in the contract gave the city the right to 
claim and l'"ecoup a·gainst the agreed price 
the actual damages sustained; such damages~ 
if any, to 'be esta'blished only by evi'denee 
showing the natm"e and extent thereof.'' 
·The foregoing case followed the established 
principle of la'v in the absence of a provision in 
the con tract for liquidated damages. 
In the instant case the court denied the defen-
dant the opportunity of proving his actual damages, 
or of even stating a claim in recoupment against 
the plaintiff, and ruled as a matter of law that the 
subcontract Sections 3 and 5 (k) and (1) precluded 
him from asserting any claim fo1,. damages against 
the plaintifft 
~section 3 of the Su·bcontract provides: 
''The subcontractor agrees to complete 
the several portions and the whole of the work 
therein sublet by the time or times following: 
10 
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(Here insert the date or dates; and if there 
by liquidated damages,. state them.) 
"Delivery o'f materials to keep up as di-
rected, behind grading equipment at all times. 
·should contractor have to assume charge on 
account of delay by subcontractor, the expense 
accrued therein \\Till be deducted f1·om the 
contract price. Contractor to receive gravel 
at site of crushing plant in the bin." 
This subsection of the contract is in part the 
language of the partie'S and in part the standard-
ized language of the Standard Form of Subcontract 
as approved and copyrighted by the American In-
stitute of Architects .. A reading of the entire con-
tract ·clearly indicates that assuming control of the 
su·bcontract was not stated as, nor .intended to ·be~ the 
exclusive remedy of the contractor in the e,lent the 
plaintiff su·bcontractor fell into default, in supply-
ing the material as dit~ected by defendant. 
It 'is an establishe·ct pi·inciple of law that when 
work is to lbe done by a time certain, the party for 
whom the wot•k is to be done, ~y allowing it to con-
tinue after that date, treats the contract as still 
in force, but waives the materiality o'f time. Sueh 
does not constitute a waitler of his right to damages 
sustained by reason of the delay. 
The early case of Sinclair v.. Talmadg-e~ 35 
Barb. 602 (N.Y. 1861),. adopted this rule of law 
and it has been generally applied by the courts 
throughout America. 'There t~e plaintiff had con-
11 
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tracted to build certain stores fo1~ the defendant, 
which were not completed within the time specified. 
Upon the defendant~s refusal to pay a portion of 
the final installn1ent, suit was 'instituted by him 
to l"€C01ler the llllpaid pol~tion. The court stated, 
page 606: 
'QThe defendants, by suffering the plain-
tiffs to go on after the time limit, and com-
plete the buildings; waived for forfeiture, 
which they might have claimed had they ex-
acted it on the day. It was the right of the 
defendants to rescind the contract after the 
day upon which the work was to have been 
done; and had they done so, the plaintiffs 
could not have recovered for the work done. 
But both parties,. after that treated the con-
tl"act as still in force, and the plaintiff was 
suffered to go on under it, and the claim of 
the defendants is now limited to damages for 
nonperformance as to time, and this claim 
has been allowed them.''" See also Foster v. 
W-orth-ington, 2 N. Eng. R .. 4·74t 59 Vt. 65. 
A similar situation existed in the case of Mc-
111aster ,r. State, 108 N.Y. 542, 15 N .. E .. 417 (1888), 
where the contractor agreed to furnish and cut stone 
for the construction of certain 'buildings. The speci-
fications for the buildings we1~e later altere·d by the 
o'vner in violation of the contract so as to require 
the building then re1naining unconstructed to be 
bt1ilt of ·brick and merely trimmed with stonet The 
court observed: 
''It is undoubtedly the rule that where 
12 
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one party to a contract breaks the same, the 
other party may stop and refuse further per-
formance. But, instead of doing so, he may 
perform so far as he is permitted, and then 
claim the damages he has suffered from the 
breach. Here the contractors furnished and 
cut the stone for the trimmings~ not under a 
new contract,. but under and in performance 
of the original contract, and for the prices 
therein mentioned~ and this they could do 
'~lithout any ratification of the modification 
of the contracts attempted by the State. 
,;'Further, the fact that a party continues 
to perform a contract follo\ying a breach by 
the other party, carries \vith it no presunlp-
tion that there was a Vv-raivcr of his right of 
action for the breach of the contract, by the 
n1ere fact that ·he procee<ied v;lith the work 
after the breach.H ;."1;Jarkey v .. Jl il-u-:a1t-kee, 76 
''lise. 349, .4_5 N. \V. 28 ( 1890). 
In a case which is strikingly similar to the one 
at bar" a su~bcontractor sought to recover fo1· rail-
road construction work from the general contractor. 
The general contractor claimed the right to set off 
the expense of doing ceitain \Vork which exceeded 
the amotrnts uwing the subconti·actor in rega1·d to 
which the subcontractor 'vas in default under the 
terms of his contract, and also under an agreement 
for an extension of time. ·The couit, in holding that 
the general contracto1,.s were ent-itled to the set off 
said: 
''As to the retained pet~centage, it would 
seem that, by the express terms of the con-
13 
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tract bet\veen Sands and Oli\'er and Quigg, 
they had the right of set-off, for the contract 
says: 'The said t~etained percentage to be held 
by the contractor as a guarantee for the faith-
ful performance vf his contract as herein 
stipulated." But upon general principles gov· 
ern'ing the right of set-off, independently of 
the terms of the contract, Sands & Oliver had 
the 1·ight to have allowed in their favor any 
demand they might establish against Quigg 
for breach of his contract vrith them.'' Sands 
v. Qu-igg, 111 Va. 476, 69 S. E. 440 (1910). 
The U. S. Supreme Court recognized this rule 
in the case of Dermott v. Jones, 23 How. (U. S.) 
220, 16 L. Ed. 442. The defendant had engaged the 
plaintiff to build a build'ing and the contraet called 
for installments of $5,000t00 to be pa'id July 1, 1851; 
another installment of $5,000.00 to be paid October 
1, 1851; and a final payment of $14,000.00 was to 
be paid January 1, 1860. The building was to be 
ready for use October 1, 1851 . .An action was brought 
to recover the second installment of $5,000.00, which 
was not paid by October 1, 1851, and the answer 
denied that the !building was ready for use on the 
due date. The testimony in fact showed it was com-
pteted and accepted December ·4, 1851. 
"In such a case, the party cannot recover 
the remuneration stipulated for in the con-
tract, because he has not done that which was 
to be the consideration of it. Still, if the other 
Qarty has derived any benefit from the labor 
done, it would be unjust to allow ·him to retain 
14 
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that \vithout paying anything. The law, there-
fore, implies a promise on h'is part to pay 
such a remuneration as the ·benefit conferred 
is really worth . . ~ '' See also Phillips Cons trtf.e-
tion Co. v .. Seymottr1 91 U. S. 646, 23 L~ Ed. 
341, where the court found that t1rging a 
builder to go on and the making of part pay-
nlent after failure constitutes a \Vaiver of the 
strict perfo1,.mance as to time. 
Thus, in the case before the court, the max'i-
mum amount the plaintiff is entitled to recover is 
the actual net benefit~ if any, resulting to defendant, 
which is the contract price, less the amount of dam-
age occurring to defendant, by reason of plaintiff's 
delay in perfot~mance . 
.. i\. summary of the law on this point is con-
tained in Williston on Contracts, Section 699 (Rev. 
Ed~). 
'~Many cases have arisen where builders 
and contractors ha1le failed to complete the 
agreed work ·by the time fixe'd in the con-
tract . .. . . If after the time has al1,.eady 
elapsed, the owner permitB the ~builder to con ... 
tinue to work, even if the contract or ma-
teriality of the breach gave the o\vner power 
to terminate the contract on such a contin-
gency, his conduct is an election to go on with 
the contract rather than to forfeit it, and on 
the completion of the work the owner is liable 
for the price, though he is entitled to a cross 
cla'im for any damages caused by the delay., 
('Citing cases) . 
''The true measure of recovery is the 
sum stipulated in the agreement, less the 
15 
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damages sttstained by the failure strictly to 
perfo1·m. ·The principle underlies all decisions 
in,:rolving consideration of the proper rule for 
ascertaining the an1ount recoverable in cases 
of substantial performance of contracts for 
services or for the furnishing of materials~ 
All the decisions are referal})le to the under-
lying principle that the party in default can 
never gain by his default, and the other party 
can never be permitted to lose by it." 58 Am .. 
~fur .. , "\\!ork & La·bor, Sections 53 and 54. 
In the instant case, plaintiff's constant refusal 
to "catch up with the contract'' by supplying suffi-
cient gravel materials to permit the graveling por-
tion of the operation to maintain pace with the 
grading aspect of the road construction gave the 
defendant two altei·na ti ves. First, he could have 
terminated the contract and engaged another to 
perform it; and under the te1~n1s of the contract~ 
Section 3, 'vhich merely stated the general rule of 
law, the additional expense in so doing could have 
been deducted from the contract price. Second, the 
defendant could permit the plaintiff to continue with 
his contract. Under the prinlciple of law discussed 
a·bov·e, defendant would then waive the materiality 
of the time of performance, but would be entitled 
to offset the damage resulting to himself ·by reason 
of the delay against any amounts which became due 
for performance unde1,. the contract. 
It should be noted in this case that the segment 
of road which was being constructed was in a remote 
16 
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area of the State, and the defendant was undoubted-
ly faced with a practical problem in obtaining gravel 
to complete his contract for the State of Utah. ·The 
fact that he permitted the plaintiff to ren1ain on 
the jo·b and produce gravel a.t a rate substantially 
less than contemplated b~r the parties, did not can ... 
stitute a waiver of his right to claim damages by 
reason of that delay .. As indicated above, the plain .. 
tiff cannot take ad,rantage of his delay in perform ... 
ance, and the defendant should not ·be permitted to 
lose by it. 
B. Section 3 of the con tract do.es not provide ·an exclu-
sive remedy of defe nda.nt7 and taking over of the 
supplemental contract by defendant did not con-
stitute a waiver of his right to a·ssert damages 
against piaintiff, "\Vhich arose from delay. 
~4...pparently the trial court 'vas of the opinion 
that Section 3 of the Subcontract provided an ex-
clusive remedy of defendant in event of delay by 
plaintiff in the pei'formance of his contract. It 
should be noted that a Supplemental agreement was 
entered into between the parties December 4, 1957, 
(Exhibit 4), for the state(i purpose of completing 
two items covei·ed by their original contract of Jan-
uary 17, 195·7, ''without affecting the rights of either 
of said parties under the terms of the contract .... '~ 
The plaintiff failed to perform the supplemental 
contract and defendant tet'minated it and took o'Ter 
its performance .. This action did not wai,re his right 
17 
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to look to plaintiff for the damage he had suffered 
by reason of the delay in performing under the 
original contract of JanualJ-T 17, 1957. 
The failure to properly analyse the rights of 
the dan1aged party as a result of delay in the per-
fornlance of a contract '\Vas considered in the case 
._ 
of Fran,kfort-Ba·rr~ett Co. v. U'illiam Prym Co~, 237 
F. 21, 28, 29 (2nd Cir. 1916). 
The defendant had agreed to supply fasteners 
to the plaintiff 'by a certain date and failed to do so. 
The parties entered into a later agreement, whereby 
the plaintiff agreed to accept delivery of a quantity 
of faste11ers according to the terms of the original 
contract. The question pi·esented for the appeal court 
V{as whether or not the plaintiff waived his right 
as pertained to the original breach by reason of the 
defendant's failtlre to deliver the fasteners under 
the earlier contract.. The court held that there was 
not such a waiver. 
~"The difficulty in this case has grown 
out of the failure to distinguish between the 
waiver of a right to treat a ·breach of the con-
tract as a discharge of the contract, and a 
wai ,rer of the right to recover the damages 
occasioned ~by the ·breach. The two rights are 
distinct and must not ·be confused. In Page 
on Contracts, VoL 3, Sec. 1509, that writer 
correctly says that waiver of the l~'ight to 
treat a breach of contract as a discharge of 
contract liability may take place without a 
18 
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\Vaiver of the right to maintain a11 action for 
damages, and the weight of authority is that 
it is not such .a waiver. And in Section 510, the 
same writer states that acceptance after 
breach is not a waiver of right of action is 
apparent when it is considered that the party 
not in default is often constrained by his 
necessities to take \Vhat he can get under his 
contract when he can get it. 
"The September agreement as set forth 
in the reply did not supersede the April con-
tract. That remained unchanged. But the 
plaintiff by agt~eeing that the defendant might 
deliver in September the fasteners which he 
was ·bou11d to deliver in Ap.ril, May, and ~June, 
simply waived his right to terminate the con-
tract and to decline to receive any deliveries 
in ·September or at any time thereafte1·; pro-
vided the defendant made the subsequent de-
liveries as then promised. There certainly was 
no intention on the plaintiff's part to do more 
than that~ and he still had his right of action 
for the damages he ·had suffered by the fail-
ure to delive1~ as promised in the April agree .. 
ment. Such '\Ve belie·~l·e to be the law in this 
country generally . . . . ,., 
A case \vith striking sin1ilarities to the one at 
bar, both as to the relationship between the parties 
and the language of the contractt \\ras before the 
''risconsin Supreme Court in Gille-n Co. v. Parke1~ 
Co.t 170 \'Tisc. 264, 171 N. 'V'l. 61, 174 N. vV. 75 
(1919). 
The defendant, Parker Company~ was a general 
contractor who undertoolc to remo,7e certain build-
19 
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ings in the city of 1flillh,.aukee. A number of sub-
contracts for d-oing part of the work were let, in-
cluding one such to plaintiff for pile dri,ring and 
\vor'k incidental thereto. ·T·he plaintiff7s contract of 
Januar~r 13, 1916, required the work to ·be started 
under it on or before January 14, 1916, and to be 
c~tnpleted ·by ~,ebruary 16, 1916. The contract pro-
'rided in part as follows : 
''"Should the subcontractor 1be obstructed 
or delayed in the prosecution and the com-
pletiol1 of the work by the neglect, delay, or 
default of any other subcontractor, . 4 • then 
there shall be an allowance of additional time 
beyond the date set for the completion of 
said ~ .. ork; ... and the general contractor 
shall a"\vard the additional time to be al-
lo,vcd ... 
,,4 4 r the general contractor shall have 
the right, at any time, to suspend the whole 
or any part Df the work he1·ein contracted 
to be done without compensation to the su~ 
contractor other than extending the time for 
completing the whole work for a period equal 
to that of such suspension." 
The work was not completely finished until 
August 26. The plaintiff subcontractor claimed 
certain datnages, including additional labor costs, · 
extra liability insurance, extra expense of operation 
of the steam launch" extra fuel, cost for additional 
lines used on drivers, for towing of defendant tugs, 
and other charges. Plaintiff had judgment below, 
20 
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and the defendant appealed, assigning as error the 
allowance of damages, claiming that the contract 
between the parties, and particularly the prov'isions 
cited above, provided that the only remedy the 
plaintiff might ha,re for any delay caused by de-
fendant was limited solely to an extension of time 
to be given the plaintiff for the completion of the 
work ·beyond the time ·stipulated in the contract. 
The court rejected this contention in the fol .. 
lowing language: 
"~The general rule therefor applied, that 
where labor and material are to be furnished 
and rendered by the one party and to be paid 
for by the other, and the one furnishing the 
work, labor~ or material is dependent to some 
extent upon the other party performing his 
part or providing for the prompt performance 
by others of a portion of the work, there a1·ises 
by implilcation an obligation on such person, 
situated as is the defendant here, not only 
to refrain from doing that which will inter-
fere or impede the contractor in the perfor .. 
mance of his part, ·but that it vnll also do 
all that which is reasvna.bly necessary in order 
to enable the contracting party to so perform. 
For a failure in eithe1,. 1,.espect, damages can 
properly be awarded to the person so delayed 
or impeded." (Citing cases) (P. 67.) 
Similarly, in the case of American Concr-ete 
Steel Company v. Ha·rt, 285 F. 322, 327 (2nd Cir. 
1922), Hart brought an action against the Ameri-
can ·Concrete Company to recover approximately 
21 
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$13,000.00 under the terms of a contract between 
the parties to do excavation work in connection with 
the erection of a building on Staten Island. The third 
cause of action was based upon a breach of a pro· 
'rision of the contract providing for damages in 
event of delay; the fomth cause of action was based 
upon a breach of an implied agreement by American 
Concrete Steel Company not to hinde1,. ot· delay Hart 
in the prosecution of his vlork. The District Court 
found the issues in favor of Hart upon ·both causes 
of action. 
Although Hart agreed, in a portion of the con-
tract which was written into a fo1·m contract, to 
perform in such a manner as to cause ll{) delay 'in 
the construction of the building, and the printed 
form portion of the contract provided that where 
Hart delayed in the performance of his contract by 
defendant, the time for performance would be ex .. 
ten9,ed· pi·oviding timely application was madet It 
wa.s further mutually agt~eed that if either party 
suffered loss through delay of the other,. I·eimburse-
ment would be made. 
'The defendant claimed the two provisions of 
the contract relating to delay \Vel~e repugnant and 
should be ignored by the court .. In this connection, .. ; 
the court in upholding the right of plaintiff to re-
cover damages for delay, o-bserved as follows: 
'' ..... The contract was drawn by laymen, 
22 
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who probably took the printed form for grant-
ed, and did not realize the controversy which 
it might provoke4 Ordinarily a contract states 
a date or a period of time upon or within 
which i L is to be completed; 1but no such pre-
cise limitation is found in the contract4 
'~When a contract does fix a date or 
period of time, these two clauses are readily· 
reconcilable. The first provision is designed 
to extend the time for the completion of the 
contract by the contractor in case of delay 
caused by an o\vner, an architect, or others 
than h"imself mentioned in the contract. The 
second provision affords to each of the parties 
the right to be reimbursed for such damages 
as may be suffered ·by the delay of the other. 
That such provisions are not repugnant seems 
to be settled by G1t.eri11.:i Ston.e Company v. 
CaTlin, 240 Ut S. 26.4, 36 ·s .. Ct. 300, 60 L. 
Ed~ 636, and Gen.oves.e v. Third Aven.tte Rail ... 
way Co4, 13 App. Div. 412, 43 N. Y. Supp. 
8 affirmed, 162 N. Y. 614, 57 N. E. 1108t"" 
The purpose of including in the contract the 
remedy of the nondefaulting party is important in 
determining the intended meaning~ In the case of 
Nelson v. Pickwick Associated Company, 30 Ill. 
App. 333 (1889), the parties entered into a contract 
by which the plaintiff undertook to do painting and 
glazing of a building being erected for the defen-
dants. The specifications provided that the work 
was to be completed on a day certain, and was to 
be done so as not to delay other co-operating con-
tractors. The following provision was included in 
the contract: 
23 
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ushould delay be caused by other con .. 
tractors to the positive hinderance of the con~ 
tractor ·hereto~ a just and proper amount of 
extra time shall 'be allowed by the archi-
tect . . . '" 
Judgment '\Vas entet~ed in favor of plaintiff for 
datnages resulting from defendant's delay. 
The question presented on appeal was 'vhether 
or not the "extra time'' was the only and exclusive 
remedy of plaintiff when he was delayed lby other 
contractors. The court held that it was not. The pro-
vision in the contl~act was for the plaintiff's benefit 
and pt~ovided for an allowance of additional time to 
him ·but 'vas not in depri·vation of his rights to re-
quire the 'vork to be done in readiness fo1· him. 
See also the case of illason Tire attd Rubber Co. 
v. Ctf..mmin~~Bla-ir Co~, 116 Ohio St. il54, 157 N. E. 
367 (1927), "'The1·e plaintiff was permitted to re-
cover dan1ages resulting from delay even though 
a provision for extension of time was included in 
the c 011 tr actt 
·T·he provision, in the subcontract in the pre-
sent case, authorizing defendant to withhold money 
fron1 plaintiff in the event defendant found it neces---
sary to assume control because of delay by the plain-
tiff in supplying gravel for the construction of the 
1·oad, was obviously written for the benefit of de-
fendant to give him control of the project, and to 
enable him to perform his prime contract with the 
24 
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State of Utah. The prov1s1on was intended as an 
additional remedy and was "not in dept~ivation of 
his rights". 
(~~ Section 3 of the contract does not make provision 
for liquidated damagest as referred to in Section 
5 (k). Thus~ the basis for computing damages ·is 
the actual damage -suffered ·by defendant by reason 
of the delay. 
On the basis of the trial court's ruling there 
was implied a determination that liquidated dam--
ages were set forth in the subcontract~ It will be 
helpful to refet~ again to Section 5 of the subcontract,. 
which provides: 
'~The contractor and subcontractor agree 
to fbe bound by the terms of the agreement, 
the general conditions, drawings and speci-
fications as far as applicable to this subcon-
tract, and also by the following pro,lisions: 
''The contractol'" agrees: 
H (k) To make no demand for liquidated 
damages 01,. penalty for delay in any sum in 
excess of such amount as may be specifically 
named in the subcontract.'' 
This language is included in the printed form 
of the contract. The entire subcontract was not 
written by an attot,ney who was acquainted with 
the teehnical usage of terms as used in the printed 
form, but by laymen. The only provision in the sub-
contract even refering to liquidated damages is set 
forth in Section 3, which has been quoted above .. 
That reference is one in small type inserted in 
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parentheses which reads: '' (Here insert the date 
or dates, and if there be liquidated damages, state 
them)." Section 3 makes no attempt to set forth 
liquidated damages, nor "\\Tas there any intention to 
include such. 'The prime contract had contained in 
it a provision for liquidated damages whireh would 
be applied against the contractor (defendant)~ How-
ever, there was no mention in the subcontract of 
liquidated damages or penalty· which was to :be in-
cluded in it. This becomes even more apparent when 
cases are consulted which define the nature of liqui-
dated and unliquidated damages. A technical con-
struction of the typew1·itten language as contained 
in Section 3 of the cont1·act, does not inclicate a 
provision for liquidated damages. 
''Damages are said to be liquidated when 
they can be determined from the contract 
itself, or from the contract and the rules of 
la'v applicable thereto, and where it is neces-
sary to introduce evidence before plaintiff 
can pro,re his case, the damages are said to 
'be unliquidated.'" Lepman & Haggie v .. Inter-
State Produce Cmnpany, 205 IlL App. 2170 
( 1917). 
A rather complete discussion of liquidated dam-
ages is contained in the case of Cockrane v .. Forbes~ 
26'7 Mass. 417,. 420, 166 Nt E~ 752, 753: - w 
'(Liquidated damages 'mean damages, 
agi·eed upon as to amount by the parties, or 
fixed by operation of law, or under the cor-
rect applicable principles of law made certain 
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in amount by the terms of the contract, or 
susceptible of being made certain in amount 
by mathematical calculations from factors 
which are or ought to be in the possession or 
knowledge of the party to 'be charged .. Un-
liquidated damages are those which cannot 
thus be made certain by one of the parties 
alone., ~, 
In the case of Placealla v. Robbio, 47 R. I. 180, 
131 A. 64 7 ( 1926), suit was brought ·by a father 
and a son as building contractors for a balance of 
84,000.00 due on a cont1·.act and for the reasonable 
worth of '"extras.'' Defendants sought to 1·ecoup 
certain lost rentals, and these with the extras, were 
the only items on which the testimony conflicted .. 
There was no dispute as to the balance due on the 
contract, and the amouni to which defendants were 
entitled for payments made on 'behalf of plaintiffs. 
The trial resulted in a general verdict for the plain-
tiffs in the approximate sum of $2,200 .. 00, whereas 
they had claimed a balance due of $2~800f00. 'The 
defendants moved for a new ti~ial, a"\rel~ring that the 
verdict was against the law, against the evidence, 
and that the amount was excessi~le. 
''. .. .. Plaintiff's claim, being contrac ... 
tual, is not,. as argued, one for liquidated dam· 
ages. It does not arise out of any express 
agreement as to the value of the work done. 
It arises from the implied obligation to pay 
what the extras are reasonably worth. The 
damages are unliquidated. 'Liquidated dam-
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ages are those whose amount has been deter-
n1ined by anticipatory agreement between the 
parties.' ~unliquidated damages are those not 
so fixed but determined after they have re-
sulted.' Cyc. Law Dictionaryt p. 221; Bouvier 
La \i\7 Dictionary. 
"'Plaintiff's damages were made upon a 
group of items, some or all of which might be 
valid in whole ot~ in part, and the amolUlt of 
a reasonable charge for which, in many in-
stances~ was a matter of dispute. . .. In 
point of fact, plaintiff's verdict is for the 
total of the items supported by a preponder-
ating evidence. The trial court's I"e.sult, as well 
as that of the jui·y, can be reached only by 
determi~ing the a!llount of each item .so ~up­
ported by the evidence and 'by adding the 
se·v·eral i terns together . . . '' 
In the case of D·u·?tcan. Lumber Company v. 
L·eon~rd Lumber Co., 332 Ill. 104, 163 N .. E. 416 
(1928), the plaintiff company sought and obtained 
a judgment for approximately $1,200.00 for lumber 
sold to the defendant. Defendant filed a claim of 
set-off, although not dit?puting the liability fo11P the 
claim sued on but alleged that prior to the sale for 
which I"ecovei·y was made, plaintiff contracted to 
sell and deli,ler to defendant certain other lumber; 
and thereafte1,. plaintiff refused to deliver the lum ... 
ber, a11d defendant \vas compelled and did purchase 
in the open market lumber of the same grade and 
quality in the same amoru1t, paying a sum of approxi ... 
mately $4~000.00 more than the contract price, leav-
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ing a balance due to defendant after deducting plain-
tiff's claim of approximately $2,700400. The set-off 
was not allowed and judgment was accordingly en-
tered for the plaintiff. Under the statutes of Illinois, 
set-offs, where liquidated were authorized. 
The trial court held that the damages claimed 
as set-off were unliquidated and could not be set off 
in an action at law. In this connection the court 
stated at page 416: 
'~Defendant contends its claim of set-off 
is the difference between the market value of 
the lumber at the time the contract was 
·breached and the price agreed to be paid for 
it, -without any claim of special damages, and 
that damages claimed are liquidatedt ..... De-
fendent contends that the damages sought to 
be recovered by it in its set-off are liquidated 
damages and cites two decisions of the appel-
late court that if damages can be ascertained 
'by computation or calculated, they are liqui-
dated. This question has been passed upon by 
this court in numerous of the cases first above 
cited. Bouvier was quoted as defining 'liqui-
dated damages' to be a certain sum due, and 
that it must appear not only that something 
is due but also how much is due, or the debt 
is not liquidated. 'An unliquidated debt is 
one which one of the parties cannot alone ren-
der certain.' " ·see also Higbie v. R·ust, 211 Ill. 
333~ 71 N. E. 10·10, to the same effect. 
Any damages resulting to defendant had he 
assumed control of the subcontract would have re-
quired the introduction of testimony to the same 
extent as would be necessa1·y for the defendant to 
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prove his actual damages. Acco1·ding to the standard 
set out in the foregoing cases, there could not be 
liquidated da1nages, since there was not agreement 
as to the value of the wot~k to be done, nor 'vould 
the claims be susceptible of being made certain in 
an1ount ·by mathematical calculations or by one of 
the parties alone. 
Liquidated damages were not intended or pro-
vided in the contract. 
D.. Section 5 ( 1) docs not rQqui re defendant to give 
notice to plaintiff for damages .sought for delay in 
p crf ornring the contract .. 
Section 5 ( 1) of the subcontract does not re-
quire defendant to give notice for damages sought 
through delay but only for materials supplied and 
'\Vork performed. The particular subsection states 
as follows: 
''"That no claim for services rendered or 
materials furnished 'by the contractor to the 
subcontractor shall be valid unless written 
notice thereof is g_iven by the contractor to the 
su·bcontractor during the first ten days of 
th·e calendar month following that in which 
the claim originated.'' 
As pointed out above, the trial court l~uled as 
a matter of law that this subsection construed in 
connection with Section 5 (k) and Section 3 pre .. 
eluded the defendant as a tnatter of la'v from as-
serting damages by way of counterclaim. 
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Since the language used; namely~ services ren-
dered, or materials fut~nished, are not technical in 
their nature, the ordinary usage of these words is 
tt 111 trolling. 
In this connection the case of State of Colorado 
v. Un-ited States~ 219 F. 2d 474 (lOth ·cir., 19'54) 
is helpfuL Thet~e the United ·States sought to re-
cover certain fees and penalties from the State of 
Colorado for services t~endered in establishing iden-
tity of ownership of liv·estock. The plaintiff argued 
that such constituted "stockyard services" within 
the Packers & Stockyards Act. The court stated: 
''The term 'stockyard services' is broad 
and compt~ehensive. Webster's ~ew Interna-
tional Dictionary defines a service as 'any 
result of -ttsefttl labor which does not produc·e 
a tangible commodity.'" (Emphasis added.) 
The defendant,s damages as asserted and set 
forth in his counterclaim include such items as the 
cost of maintaining standby equipment amounting 
to some $12,000 .. 00, additional wages to employees~ 
including pay roll and taxes and insurance in the 
sum of $13,138.90, and equipment rentals which 
were paid by the defendant which were additional 
expenses accruing to him, which would ha-ve been 
unnecessary had the plaintiff performed wit~in the 
time specified in the subcontract. It is to be noted 
that these items are not the result of Husefullabor". 
The very fact that defendant is claiming damage 
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by reason of them and plaintiff is resisting his 
clain1,. is some indication that the damages which 
are claimed by the defendant a.re and were not use .. 
fuL On the contrary, they wei·e detrimental to all 
parties involved4 The substantial portion of the 
dan1ages set forth i11 the counterclaim of the plain .. 
tiff arc of the nature other than services and are 
not included, nor 'vere they intended to ·be included 
in the subsection cited above. \Vere it possible for 
defendant to pro~le any of the foregoing items of 
damage, the trial eri~ed in precluding him as a mat-
ter of law from doing so. 
POINT 11. 
THE COlJRT ERRED IN FINDI~G THAT PLAJN .. 
TIFF Fl}RNISHED GRA \.-~EL T·O THE DEFENDANT 
I~ AC-CORDA~CE \VITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF 
THE ·suBCONTRACT A~-rD THAT PLAINTIFF SUB-
STANTIAT_JJY PERFORI\'IED ALL OF THE COVE-
~ANTS AGREED BY Hl~f TO BE PESFORME·D .. 
Under the terms of Section 3 of the Subcon-
tract, plaintiff was required to perform his obli-
gation of producing gravel in such manner that the 
deliv"'ery of materials would keep up as directed be-
hind grading equipment at all times. 
~Ir. Hilton, Resident Engineer fo1~ the ·State 
of Utah, explained the procedure of road construc-
tion under the general contract and indicated that 
there a1~e ''some thirty-six items'' included in the 
contract ('T. 76) .. It is first necessary to prepare 
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the ground by clearing· it to prepare for building 
the subroad. ...~t this stage of construction, other 
items of construction can be done; such as, "placing 
of pipe" and the ''placing of fence" ( T. 76). At 
this point tllc sulbgrade is constructed. vvnen the 
~ubgrade is completed, the gravel can be applied. 
1\Il'. Hilton indicated that the nature of the soil 
in the area was sandy and ,.:rery difficult to keep in 
place and required an extreme amount of water. 
Mr. \Vood was instructed by Mr4 Hilton that ''as 
soon as the subgrade was ready .... the gravel 
(was to be) placed on ... so we wouldn't have to 
continue to water the subgradc in order to keep 
traffic and the wind f1,.om blowing it. Actually, 
a lot of it was blow sand and in some cases no 
amount of water would continue to maintain that 
road . . . and I wanted ·him to place this gra,Tel 
right behind the subgrade preparation" (T. 77). 
Without the gravel on the SU1broad, the traffic would 
mire in the sand. 
In addition to maintaining the subgi .. ade stt·uc-
ture, gravel was required upon the su·bgrade im-
mediately to ~~stabilize the subbase', (T. 77). 
Mr. Hilton indicated that the gravel was to 
keep within one thousand feet of the subgradc op-
eration, which included the I·ough grading, so there 
would not be interference between the two opera-
tions (T. 78-79). He further indicated that for the 
week ending March 2, 1957, approximately twenty 
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per cent of the subgrade or the rough grading had 
been completed; and as of that date, no gravel 
had been prepared (·T. 82). 'Thus, approximately 
2.4 miles of subgrade had been prepared, a.ll of 
'vhich VT .. as ready for gra,rcL On ~June 29,. 195-7, the 
rough grading was one hundred per cent completed; 
whereas, the gravel was only 68 _per cent complete~ 
or approximately 4 miles ·behind ( T. 86). 
Approximately three weeks after Mr. Bethers 
finally ·arri,led on the job, \Vhich would be approxi-
mately March 25, 1957, Mr. Hilton, in company 
vlith Mr. \Vood (defendant), went to Mr. Bethers 
for the purpose of obtaining a 8chedule to obtain the 
needed gravel to catch up with the grading. That 
con,rersation in part was as follows: 
"Q. Did :'vir. Wood give any instruction 
to Mr. Bethers ... with reference to keeping 
the gravel up to the grading equipment1 
·''A. Yes, he ilid. 
''Q. 'What was that instruction? 
''A. \i\Tell, Mr. Wood informed Mr. Beth-
ers that he had been after him to have him 
. keep this gravel Dn there and that he wanted 
some infoi·mation covering when he could ex .. 
pect this gravel and he told him since I was 
putting pressure to apply on him that he 
v1anted some information from Mr. Bethers 
as to when this gravel would be available. 
(T. 89~90). 
''Qt Now did you have any other con-
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versations 'vith Mr4 Bethers, "'~ith Mr .. \\rood 
present, relativt~ to the condition of the amount 
of gravel that had been, 01· was being deliv-
ered? 
"A. Yes. On at least two othet~ occa-
sions. Once, of maybe two weeks later than 
thisJ \Tt.J0 also went to him again and prac-
tically the same thing Vv"'as discussed .. . ~" 
(T4 90) 
Mr. Hilton also testified to other conversations 
between plaintiff and defendant, where the critical 
need for gravel \Vas discussed, and Mr. Wood made 
demands for material (T. 91)4 He indicated that 
Mr. Wood was delayed because of the lack of gravel 
('T. 94). Speaking of the period after the gravel 
crusher arrived on the job until the end of June, 
1957, Mr4 Hilton stated: 
''A. \\r ell, there o'bviou sly were equip-
ment as well as men waiting for gravel. As 
I stated, I have a crew there of which I am 
responsible to see that they do their job in 
respect to the contractor and in this case I 
had to have an inspector available, a weigh 
man and a gravel spreader, and I have had 
them go out to the crusher site and sit there 
and wait as high as two days waiting for 
gravel to be crushed tl1at was never crushed. 
''Q. Did you nbserve the same condition 
with respect to the equipment and men of 
Mr. Wood? 
A.. Yes." ( T .. 95). 
Subsequent to signing the subcontract, plain-
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tiff and defendant engaged in a conversation 'vhich 
took place on the same day the contract was signed. 
The parties went over the pl~oposed schedule of op-
eration and jt was estimated that the gravel was 
to be .supplied and completed in June or July. The 
plaintiff indicated that that would give him plenty 
of time in which to complete his contract. The plain .. 
tiff then estimated that his homly production would 
run fl~om 350 to 400 tons of Type 2 and from 250 
to 350 of the inch minus material (T4t 135). Mr. 
Wood then instructed Mr. Bethers as follows: 
"I then told Mr. Bethers - I said, 'Mr4 
Bethers, we don1t want a misunde1,.sta.ndi~g 
here. It looks to me like our problem at this 
point is how we can keep this gradin·g ahead 
of our production, what you anticipate this 
plant will put out.'' I showed him the plans. 
Then we said, 'We've got this section here 
that has got ten thousand yards that has to 
·be within one thousand feet or a half a point 
and then we go down to another point.t We 
pointed this out to him that the1·e is one place 
~here where we've a half a millifln yards --
excuse me, better than one hundred thousand 
yards that goes in to one fill. Now how are 
we going to keep you satisfied when we get 
to this point4 Your crushing plant is going to 
·be do'Wll. \V c can't prepare the grade fast 
enough. He said, ~That is all right. We can 
work on the plant off .and on all the time. 
There is always work that you can do on a 
plant, so we won't worry about that.' But he 
gave us the assurance of every way that I 
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know how to get it that gx~avel would be there 
when the grade was prepared.~, 
At this time Mr. Bethe1,.s indicated on the day 
the con tract was signed, which was January 17, 
1957, that he would have the crushing equipment 
on the site within a weekt 
Testimony indicated that the c1,.usher did not 
in fact arrive on the site until March 4, approxi-
mately a month and a half later" during which 
period of time Mr. Wood had made several requests 
and inquit'ies of Mr. Bethers that it would lbe on 
the jo'b within a day or twot The day following the 
arrival of the crusher, Mr .. Wood, in the presence of 
another, had a conversation with Mr .. Betherst in 
which he indicated his concern about being behind 
schedule and asked Mr~ Bethers what he was going 
to do to catch up, and gave him instructions as to 
the manner in which it was to ·be produced ('T. 3·9). 
In accordance with the contract, Mr. Wood instruct-
ed him that the gravel was to be stored in the bin 
and was assured that the same would be installed 
"in a couple of days.'' (T. 139) Mr. \'load again 
explained the problem relative to keeping up with 
the machinery and indicated the difficulty that was 
being experienced in getting traffic through because 
of the absence of gravel on the grade. Again Mr .. 
\v· ood directed him by telling him to catch up with 
his contract, indicating that the gravel was to be 
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produced in sufficient quantity to keep up "With 
the grading (T. 139-140). Again, on about March 
15, 1957, Mr. Wood approached Mr. Bethers and 
gave him the following instruction. 
''A. I told him that we were building 
grade faster than he was producing gravel 
and that I wanted him to do something about 
it. I wanted him to run the crusher more or 
s-uggested that he run a dou1ble shift; that 
h_e do something a·bout catching up. vrith his 
contTact. I didn't have a solution myself. I 
couldn't tell hirp. what to do.'' ( T. 140). 
Mr.· \Vood had another conversation with Mr. 
Bethers t~elative· to the condition ·of the contract 
during. the latter part of May.- Ml\ Wood indicated 
to. 1\fr. B~.thers that. -the job ''a·bsolutely· was clear 
out of l'"eason as far as ·keeping up with the contract 
\vas conc.erned, and that something absolutely .· j 
h~d tO. be done" (T· . .144) .. 11r. ~7ood doubted the 
ability of·M1'1. Bethers- to catch up with the contract 
and suggested that additional equipment be ob .. 
tained .. Mr. Bethers then indicated that he had made 
arrangements for another crusher for the purpose of 
helping him finish the contract (T .. 144). The crush-
er \Vas not v·btained by Mr. Bethers, and defendant 
W'ood made contact with a Mrt Allen who owned 
the crusher and sent his own transport for the 
purpose of moving the crusher onto the site, and 
with the assistance of M1,.. Wood's men the crusher 
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was placed in opet~ating condition and operated for 
approximately four days (T. 146). 
From the time the subcontract ~·as entered 
into 'between the parties there was delay on the 
part of the plaintiff. First of all, he indicated his 
willingness to hav·e the crusher on the jo'b within 
a week. It did not arrive for approximately six 
weeks, at which time approximately 21/2 miles of 
the subgrade was completed4 Even after the ct~usher 
arrived, after insistence on the part of 'Mt~.. Wood 
and visits from :\1r. Hilton, the Resident Engineer, 
the plaintiff failed to produce gravel in sufficient 
quantities to keep up to his contract As a matter 
of fact, he fell so far behind in the production 'Of his 
gravel that by the end of June, v.rhen the entire sub-
grade had been con1pleted, 'he \Vas over four miles be-
hind. As was noted above, Mr. 'Arood went to him on 
numerous occasions in an attempt to resolve the 
problem, and suggested that a double shift be run, 
which the plaintiff declined to do4 He then suggested 
that additional equipment be olbtained, which Mr. 
Bethers accepted and then did not follow through. 
Mr. Wood, in an effort to bring the gravel produc-
tion up to the grading, sent his O\Vl1 equipment for 
a gravel crusher and placed it in· operating condi-
tion. The record is replete with evidence to the 
effect that the grave1 production was not only de-
layed, but the conduct of Mr. Bethers was capri-
cious and unreasonable to an extent as to harass 
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the defendant in the performance of his contract. 
It is to be noted further that the representa .. 
tion of gravel production on the part of Mrt Bethers 
was that he could produce ·between 250 and 400 
tons per hour, depending upon the type of gravel 
that was being I"Un. The pi·oduction records which 
were kept by the Resident Engineer reflect that this 
schedule of production was seldom if ever main-
tained (See Exhibit 14, various Reports indicat-
ing daily production of gravel), and was far less 
than the admitted capacity of the crusher .. 
Had the gravel been pt~oduced as ·Mr. Bethers 
indicated that it would be, the difficulty would have 
been in keeping the rough gi"ading ahead of the 
grav·el production, and not in keeping gravel pro-
duction up to the grading .. 
CON·CLUSION 
For the foi·egoing reasons, it is respectfully 
submitted tllat the Findings of Fact are not sup-
ported by fue e'ridence; that the decision of the trial 
should be reversed and this case remanded for a 
new trial to allow defendant to prove his asserted :~~ 
':< 
counterclaim. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON, BALDWIN & ALLEN 
JOHN G.. MARSHALL 
jfERLIN R. LYBBERT 
Attorneys jo1'" 
Defendant and Appellant 
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